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Toward an Ecclesiastical Professional Ethic: Lessons from the Legal Profession 
Daniel R. Coquillette and Judith A. McMorrow 
The sexual abuse crisis in the America Catholic Church has thrust us into a social 
drama.  Where social drama occurs in the United States, lawyers are sure to be present.  
Adding a few dozen lawyers to any stressful situation inevitably has interesting 
consequences.  The advocacy ethic of lawyers, which is captured in our Rules of 
Professional Conduct,not only encourages but compels the lawyer to function as a 
zealous advocate for the client.  That assures that the client’s point of view is strongly 
presented.  From the perspective of some observers, that adversarial ethic encourages 
distortion and elevation of the interests of the individual over that of the collective.  
Whatever the challenges of having the legal system – and lawyers – involved in the 
current crisis, it has had the benefit of identifying individual, and to a lesser extent 
institutional, failures. 
 The experience of lawyers may offer assistance beyond the representation of both 
the victims and the Catholic Church.  Lawyers, like clergy, are professionals with 
professional norms and ethical requirements.  There are obviously huge differences in 
these two professions.  But as priests to our secular religion of law, lawyers are “called 
forth and mandated by a competent authority” to function in a specific and defined role, 
the specifics of which are reflected in part in Rules of Professional Conduct (cf., Gula).  
Lawyers’ long and storied history with professional codes offers a cautionary tale to 
those exploring an ecclesiastical code of ethics 
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 The rules of the legal profession were originally designed to encourage good 
conduct.  The first set of rules, The ABA Canons of Ethics, promulgated in 1908, was 
largely aspirational, and spoke generally of loyalty and character.  As aspirational guides, 
the Canons were available for review if a lawyer happened to know of their existence.  
But many of the aspirational provisions were part of the culture of lawyering and did not 
need a formal code for weight or credibility. 
The second effort to codify lawyer conduct occurred in 1969, when the American 
Bar Association passed the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (1969).  The 
Model Code contained nine broad canons, such as “A lawyer should assist in maintaining 
the integrity and competence of the legal profession” (Canon 1) and “A lawyer should 
exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of the client” (Canon 5).  These 
broad canons were followed by somewhat more specific, but still heavily aspirational, 
Ethical Considerations (which became known colloquially as “ECs”) and very specific 
Disciplinary Rules (“DRs”).  The Ethical Considerations offered somewhat more 
guidance, but maintained an aspirational focus.  For example, “A lawyer should maintain 
high standards of professional conduct and should encourage fellow lawyers to do 
likewise.  He should be temperate and dignified, and he should refrain from all illegal and 
morally reprehensible conduct.” (EC 1-5).  The Disciplinary Rules were designed to be 
enforced in disciplinary contexts and provided the bottom-line requirements, violation of 
which could subject the lawyer to professional discipline by the state body authorized to 
control the admission and expulsion of lawyers.  For example, DR 1-102(A)(4) states that 
“A lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonest, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation.”  
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The 1969 Code of Professional Responsibility did not work well in its dual role of 
offering both broad ethical pronouncements and specific prohibitions.  Some of the 
Ethical Considerations appeared to be inconsistent with the Disciplinary Rules, important 
non-litigation issues that affect the day-to-day life of lawyers were not addressed and the 
code continued to contain provisions, such as limitations on advertising, that were seen as 
advancing the economic interests of the profession.   
The 1969 Code of Professional Responsibility was in existence a bare 10 years 
before the lawyers reevaluated the Code.  Like the current crisis in the Catholic Church, 
moral and professional failures of lawyers, including Watergate, inspired the return to the 
drafting table.  In 1983 the American Bar Association promulgated the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct.  The Model Rules presented, as its name indicates, specific rules of 
conduct, designed to be clearer and more easily enforced in disciplinary contexts.  The 
natural tendency when crafting a code during a time of crisis is to offer more guidance 
and direction, rather than less.  After all, moral failures arose because the prior guidance 
was, by definition, insufficient to stop the lapses (cf.  Nielsen).  As with the current 
discussions of an ecclesiastical code, using the code as a vehicle to build public trust is an 
understandable and potentially positive use of a code.  That goal, however, also pushes 
the code in the direction of setting baselines for behavior. 
 The evolution in the names of the lawyer codes over the last 100 years reflects 
this more directive trend.  Lawyers moved from broad canons (1908), to a code (1969), to 
rules (1983).  And the focus of these codifications similarly changed from a broad 
articulation of ethics (1908), to responsibility (1969), to a specific focus on conduct 
(1983).  While the Rules of Professional Conduct, recently refined in 2000, are somewhat 
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better vehicles to punish through a disciplinary system, no one suggests that they capture 
the normative whole of what it means to be lawyer.  Indeed, the Chair of the 2000 
revisions panel, was quite open that “Our objective [in Ethics 2000 revision of Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct] was also to resist the temptation to preach aspirationally 
about ‘best practices’ or professionalism concepts.  Valuable as the profession might find 
such guidance, sermonizing about best practices would not have--and should not be 
misperceived as having--a regulatory dimension.” (Veazy).  As St. Thomas Aquinas 
observed, punishment does not create high character and virtue, it merely deters evil 
conduct.  (Coquillette).  Codes, particularly when drawn during times of crisis with an 
eye to deterring wrongful conduct, have a very specific utility – a vehicle for control and 
punishment.  Presumably an ecclesiastical code would be more receptive to 
“sermonizing” and a tone that might “preach,” but the hydraulic pressure of crisis-
inspired codes will be toward specificity. 
 As codes tend to move to greater level of specificity, the language of values and 
the broader norms that undergird the specific prohibition often get subsumed into the 
specific prohibitions.  For example, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct for lawyers 
starts out with a preamble that invokes the larger values of the profession.  But the weight 
of the lawyer code focuses on the specifics of prohibited conduct.  For example, the 
importance of the fiduciary relationship, the value of which infuses so many specific 
provisions, is rarely mentioned in the Rules themselves. 
Accepting for purposes of discussion that there will be a pressure toward 
specificity in any ecclesiastical code, with a corresponding danger of losing sight of the 
fundamental values that drive the code, we can identify some additional challenges and 
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opportunities to a code of conduct.  Based on the experience of lawyers, we would 
predict that the challenges to an ecclesiastical code fall into five broad areas.  First, who 
gets to craft the first draft, quite apart from the complex question of adoption, will reveal 
much about the goals and likely success of a code.  Second, such a code must 
acknowledge and confront the inherent limitations of all rules: identifying the optimum 
level of discretion and understanding the role of fact-finding within a code.  Third, 
drafters must understand – as they inevitably do – the necessity of ethical awareness as a 
precondition for the effectiveness of any code.  Fourth, as a code articulates the contours 
of the role-differentiated behavior of the professional, it must be sufficiently flexible to 
reflect the challenges of role-differentiated behavior.  Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, a code of conduct by its nature focuses on the function of the individual 
professional and can be an awkward, and often ineffective, vehicle for addressing the 
need for changes in the institutional structures within which the professional functions.  
Against these challenges sits a huge and incredibly important benefit -- education. 
Who Gets to Draft the Code 
 Who crafts the first draft of a code reveals who is entitled to sit at the table, whose 
input is important, and what points of view are most likely to be reflected in the code.  
Lawyers are regulated at the state level, and these model versions of the lawyer Code and 
Rules also reflect the challenge of who should have the power of shaping the first draft.  
By a process largely of default, the “model” versions of the lawyer codes have been 
crafted by the American Bar Association (ABA).  Since the ABA is a voluntary trade 
association, it has no meaningful power to regulate lawyers.  (Violating the code would 
only get you ousted from the ABA.  For most lawyers, that would mean only losing your 
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subscription to the ABA Journal.) The real power of the Rules of Conduct is infused 
when the rules were sent to the state courts, which then could take the first draft and 
shape it to reflect the values of the state.  This process has come under increasing 
scrutiny.  Some question whether the ABA is sufficiently representative of all who are 
affected by the lawyer codes.  (Wolfram; Kaufman) There is concern about capture by 
the more elitist members of the bar.  There is always the lurking suspicion that the fox is 
guarding the chicken coop.  As other authors have noted, the same credibility challenges 
face the drafters of an ecclesiastical code.   
As the Rules of Professional Conduct moved from aspirational to regulatory, the 
states increasingly have modified the specific rules to make changes in the text on issues 
such as the duty of confidentiality, candor required to a court, whether lawyers should be 
mandatory reporters of professional wrongdoing and the like.  Changes sharpened the 
differences between those who proposed the first draft and those who have the power to 
adopt the final version.  This process can provide a vehicle for shared discussion, or 
highlight the differences and tensions between the competing perspectives.   
The Inherent Limitation of Rules 
 Professional Codes and Rules also share the inherent limitation of all rules.  Rules 
typically have as their goal to identify clear lines of conduct.  Their function is to limit 
discretion and increase perceived consistency.  To achieve that goal, they must become 
more specific.  But the more specific the rule, the less the ability to tailor the rule to new 
circumstances, and this increases the possibility of unfairness in application.  (Shauer)  
 Even assuming the rule is crafted with an optimum level of specificity, there is 
still inevitable discretion required.  The application of any code or rule requires a 
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decision-maker to analyze what rule applies, engage in fact-finding to see if the 
circumstances of the case are covered by the rule, and make a decision about remedies.  
(Alexander & Sherwin).  Fact-finding (or self-assessment about facts) is a huge challenge 
in any ethical deliberation.  How many actors in the Church crisis did not take aggressive 
action because they were not sure that wrongdoing was taking place, were hesitant about 
their competence to find facts, or were uncertain about whether someone else – more 
properly placed to take action – had intervened?  In many cases the factual uncertainty 
and requisite fact-finding can appear benign.  For example, lawyers who are required by 
both our fiduciary obligations and our Rules of Professional Conduct to avoid 
representing conflicting interests must make factual determinations, such as whether the 
interest of two clients are “directly adverse” or whether the lawyer’s judgment will be 
“materially limited.” The focus on these precise questions can cause the lawyer to lose 
sight of the important values at stake in this fact-finding. 
 Rules also tend, over time, to encourage those bound by the rules to take a 
legalistic approach to their interpretation.  The ethical rules for lawyers have become, in 
many instances, just another tool in the arsenal of lawyers in litigation with an opposing 
side.  (Wilkins).  There is also a tendency, over time, to see that everything not forbidden 
is allowed.  We are not surprised that lawyers might take a legalistic approach to their 
own code of conduct.  But this tendency is not unique to lawyers.  Since accountability is 
likely to be a goal of an ecclesiastical code (Gula), those whose conduct is held up to 
scrutiny under the code will quite naturally be put in a defensive posture. 
 All these concerns about the limits of codes are not startling new insights.  The 
Catholic Church has a rich and impressive legal system, including canon law scholars 
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who understand the complexity of doctrinal interpretation and the challenge of words as a 
constraining force.  An ecclesiastical code will not be exempt from these same 
challenges. 
Ethical Awareness and the Values behind the Rules 
Rules also require initial cognitive awareness of their possible application.  Those 
bound by the rules need ethical awareness to understand when they are moving into 
conduct that encroaches on a value behind the rules.  But that ethical awareness flows not 
from the rules themselves, but from the underlying moral values or principles that 
presumably serve as the foundation for the specific code or rule.  Kohlberg’s theory of 
moral development is illustrative.  Kohlberg hypothesized six stages of moral 
development.  Choosing to act according to rules because of a concern for punishment 
reflects a low stage of moral development.  Choosing to act according to rules in order to 
do one’s duty, respect authority and maintain social order rates higher on the scale, but 
still reflects what Kohlberg characterized as “conventional” approach.  More complex 
moral development requires the person making decisions to understand the values behind 
the rules and recognize the need to thoughtfully consider the competing claims to right 
behavior.  (Dallas) 
 Enron is a classic example.  With a relentless corporate culture of profit 
maximization, individual professionals became caught up in the corporate goals.  In 
house lawyers, who were asked to prepare the paper work for questionable transactions, 
often went through the formal process of receiving appropriate corporate approval.  They 
often acted with formal compliance with the rules.  But the essence of the transactions 
was highly questionable.  Why didn’t more lawyers within the corporation speak out? 
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From what we have gleaned from that experience, they became caught up in a corporate 
culture that saw legal questioning of a transaction as an indication that the individual 
lawyer was just not sufficiently clever to figure out how to get the transaction done.  That 
same corporate culture gave tangible rewards to those clever folks who worked around 
obstacles.  There was a slow stretching of what was seen as tolerable.  That last clever 
deal became the median point, not the outer bounds, of what was appropriate.   
The corporate culture blunted the ethical awareness of many, but not all, of the 
lawyers.  This was a process of seduction, not a conscious embracing of wrongdoing.  It 
is quite telling that the two high profile in-house professionals who most strongly 
questioned Enron’s activities were a lawyer and an accountant who had transferred into a 
division known for questionable activities.  The lawyer and accountant had came from 
outside that “20th floor.” They were able to recognize that something was seriously 
amiss.  Because they had not been part of the slow deadening of professional judgment, 
they could see what was obvious,  including what was obvious to outside reviewers 
during the post-mortem of Enron: i.e., a few individuals were engaged in serious 
wrongdoing, and a large number of other individuals acquiesced, either through active 
assistance or a decision to stay silent.   
The parallels between Enron and the crisis in the Catholic Church are striking.  
Both the executives at Enron and the abusive clergy were engaged in clear wrongdoing.  
Both criminal and corporate law had ample provisions to prohibit the worst of the 
activities in Enron.  Similarly, both criminal law and canon law provided ample support 
to censure the wrongdoing of the individual church actors.  No code of ethics will prevent 
such knowing wrongdoing.  As we are well aware, in both Enron and within the Catholic 
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Church, the most painful failures were systematic failures that flowed from tunnel vision 
of many of those around the wrongdoers.  A culture of silence impaired ethical decision-
making.  A code of conduct does not magically create ethical awareness.  Education is 
required to achieve that goal. 
Role-Differentiated Behavior 
Professional codes purport to identify rules of conduct that are specific, that 
cannot be derived from general moral principles applicable to all.  Often called role-
differentiated behavior, the notion is that lawyers and priests and others who function in a 
professional role have specific obligations that flow from their professional roles.  
(Wasserstrom) For example, the strong obligation of confidentiality shared by both 
priests and lawyers derives from the professional role.  We expect both priests and 
lawyers to maintain confidentiality, even in the face of competing claims that right 
behavior for non-priests and non-lawyers would require disclosure.  The professional 
obligation is grounded in an assessment that the greater good is achieved by maintaining 
confidentiality.  While the duty of confidentiality is often the subject of dramatic 
television shows, the reality of the life of most lawyers – and priests – is that the duty of 
loyalty and ethic of care that flow from the fiduciary obligation causes the greatest ethical 
challenges. 
We all engage in role-differentiated behavior, whether as a spouse, parent, lawyer, 
doctor, or minister.  The challenge comes when the individual sees the role (like 
compliance with rules) as a complete identification of how they should behave.  Role-
differentiated behavior was a significant culprit in both Enron and the Catholic Church 
crises.  Many individuals saw questioning as outside their role, sometimes 
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understandably so.  There was, in both cases, an assumption that others were in a superior 
position of both power and fact-finding.   
Role-differentiated behavior is an endemic challenge.  For example, one of our 
students was standing on a station platform of the “T,” the public subway, in Boston.  To 
his surprise, a 12 year old kid grabbed the purse of an old lady.  There were fifty people 
on the platform, but no one intervened.  The student reported that, inspired by a class 
discussion about Aristotelian responsibility, he unsuccessfully rushed after the purse-
snatcher.  When the student finally found a policeman at the top of the station stairs, the 
officer pointed out that he was a City of Boston policeman, and that the student would 
have to call the MBTA police.  Too many rules, too much occupational specialization, as 
Max Weber observed, can get in the way of seeing your true responsibility in a clear way. 
The Relationship between Codes and the Systems within Which They Function 
An ecclesiastical code of conduct may have an important role in sharpening 
values important in professional functioning.  But codes of professional conduct are 
directed toward individual misconduct, and their utility can drown under conflicting 
signals sent by the institutions and structures within which the professional functions.  As 
Professor Richard Nielsen notes, “external environments and internal organization 
systems and traditions can support and encourage unethical behavior.” (Nielsen) 
Again, the lawyer codes are illustrative.  They prohibit the individual lawyer from 
overbilling, lying to the court, fabricating evidence, representing conflicting interests, and 
the like.  But all the punishment is directed at the individual lawyer.  A few jurisdictions 
have flirted with the 800 pound gorilla in the room: structural systems, such as law firm 
policies and the adversary system itself, that tolerate and sometimes even encourage 
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unethical behavior.  For example, it is a violation of the lawyer’s code to state to your 
client that you have put in 100 hours when, in fact, you have worked only 50.  That false 
statement involves both lying to, and stealing from, your client.  Lawyers are 
occasionally sanctioned, some quite seriously, for such misconduct.  But law firms that 
require 2200 hours per year by associates – a work level that strongly pushes toward 
padding of time sheets – receive no disciplinary scrutiny.   
The problems of the American Catholic church demonstrate, as so many chapters 
in this volume attest, that the systems within which the professional functions can have a 
huge impact on professional choices.  Certainly we do not want a defense that “the 
system made me do it.” Such defenses have been decried since Nuremberg.  But the 
systems within which both lawyers and clergy function can blunt ethical awareness or, 
more often, create a sense of powerlessness on the part of the individual professional.  
(Nielsen) And many aspects of the system are not addressed in the professional codes. 
This problem is shared by all professionals.  Physicians, nurses and other health 
care professionals struggle with the tension between their professional ethic and the 
reality of managed care and limited resources.  Teachers struggle with professional 
obligations, in the face of increasing expectation of schools to solve complex social 
issues with inadequate resources.  Business managers must confront the relentless 
pressure of profit maximization.  A code of conduct can highlight norms and values, but 
as all authors who have touched on this subject recognize, it cannot cure institutional 
failures.   
The Rules of Professional Conduct for lawyers could not function against the 
corporate culture in Enron.  It is difficult to envision rules, certainly more specific rules, 
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that would have stopped the professional failures.  Similarly, an ecclesiastical code could 
not have corrected the numbing of ethical awareness, the discounting of the possibility of 
recurrence, and the awareness of the effects on victims.   
 Professional codes cannot function in isolation.  To be effective, a code must 
interact and be harmonious with the aspirational goals of the systems in which the 
professional functions.  As Robert Hinings has shown, organizational structure, such as 
the adversary system of justice, can either facilitate or prevent moral failure.  
Specialization by function and occupational hierarchies can be both highly desirable and 
dangerous.  In Professor Hining’s words, “our form of social organization [may] prevent 
us from recognizing our moral responsibility in the first place.” (Hinings)  This is great 
danger.   
The Value of Codes 
 Codification of ethical norms can offer some advantages.  To achieve those 
advantages, drafters must approach the process with great humility and caution.  The 
process of crafting the rules, if inclusive, can facilitate a conversation about shared 
norms.  Rules can help clarify best practices in recurring situations.  If reinforced by the 
corporate culture, rules can be part of the norm setting within the institutions.  Rules can 
be one part of a larger educational process.   
 But we must recognize that rules can, as many of the essays in this volume 
suggest, occasionally get in the way of virtue.  Here is an example we use in class.  It is 
an ethical dilemma drawn from life, not a sterile hypothetical.  A corporate client 
authorized $800,000 to settle a terrible accident in which it was clearly at fault.  The 
victims, a poor immigrant family, could not speak English.  The victim’s lawyer 
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demanded “$400,000, and not a penny less.” He was incompetent and did not know the 
value of his own case.  What should the client’s lawyer have done? The usual answer, in 
light of the confidentiality and zealousness rules, is to offer “$250,000, and not a penny 
more!” Now our students are good young men and women.  Many are religious devout, 
and know well the Sermon on the Mount and the Talmud.  But occupational rules, which 
enforce professional minimums, get in the way of their better intuitions.  For them law 
school is like a bramble bush.  As Karl Llewellyn observed, they jump in “and scratched 
out both [their] eyes.” (Llewellyn).   
We often take that blindness, the role, as inevitable.  But we forget the rest of the 
poem that inspired Karl Llewellyn’s famous book.  “[A]nd when he saw that he was 
blind, with all his might and main he jumped into another one and scratched them in 
again.” A professional may be guided by a code of conduct, even sanctioned for failure to 
comply with it.  But such a code must be constantly examined in light of larger moral 
principles.  Those larger principles have been developed, under the inspiration of the 
Church, by some of the greatest philosophical minds.  Hopefully, efforts to develop an 
ecclesiastical profession will be more successful than the legal profession in fully 
embracing this moral foundation. 
The Value of Education 
The dominant theme of this collection of essays is that the root of effective reform 
is cultural, not technical or legal.  And culture is about education, both for the clergy and 
the laity.  We are not experts on seminary education, but our hope for the legal profession 
is that, through education, we can improve the professional culture.  We spend much of 
our professional lives working with the lawyer codes and can appreciate the important, 
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but limited, utility of rules.  We have no faith in rules alone.  They are a small part of the 
much larger question of the exercise of discretion. 
Formal education within a law school, seminary or for the laity is one part of the 
educational process.  That education must include not simply analysis of the norms, but 
much more rigorous and thoughtful education about how to facilitate conversation and 
exercise discretion.  Too often formal education treats the professional with an ethical 
dilemma as an autonomous individual with no communal support in assessing right 
behavior.  We must teach students the skills of outreach in ethical discussions.  We must 
constantly remind ourselves that the greatest risk comes from cultures that silence 
discussion about right behavior. 
We also need education in context.  This is the case for casuistry – a context-
driven decision-making that brings moral theory to life.  (Tremblay) Education in context 
recognizes a role for deductive decisions from larger moral theory and virtue ethics, but 
validates the messiness of real-life decisions.  We need to be constantly teaching each 
other how deal with the real-life pressures to stay in role, ignore uncomfortable facts, and 
embrace deliberate ignorance.  This education does not end when the diploma is granted.  
It is a life-long necessity.  A final example might bring this into sharper focus.  One of 
the authors of this essay adheres to a religious tradition of pacifism, yet actively supports 
the education of commanding officers at the Naval War College in Newport through the 
Naval War College Foundation, and participate in its programs.  Why? Because in an era 
of terrorism, where there are no neat uniforms to mark combatants, the first line of 
defense against evil conduct, genocide, or war crimes is, at least on our part, the culture 
of our professional military.  That culture is based on their professional education.  The 
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War College teaches its graduates critical judgment, the judgment necessary to abstain 
from evil conduct and not to tolerate it in others, regardless of the provocation or 
justification.  The same should be true of lawyers and for the church as well.   
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